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In the beginning … 
    Once upon a time … 
    This is the story of … 
    That’s a good story …. 
  And they all lived …. 
    Let me tell you a story …. 
 
Narrative, it seems, is all around us. Bruner (2002) states that we are 
‘constantly in the process of making narratives’ (p.3) and that narrative is so 
much part and parcel of life that ‘human society cannot run without it’. In 
everyday life we recount stories about ourselves and others and in so doing 
both represent and construct ourselves. We are the heroes and heroines of our 
own stories and occasionally of the stories of others. Our experience, lives and 
Selves are storied.  In academia narrative has also found a place not only in the 
humanities but also the social sciences and even the natural sciences. It would 
seem there is no escape from participation in the narrative enterprise - it is a 
way of experiencing, relating, thinking and, ultimately, being in the world. 
Narrative, as Barthes (1977) said, ‘is simply there, like life itself’ (p.79). 
 To be sure, the development of narrative as a theory and method has 
brought (or constructed) insights into all manner of things. Narrative, emerging 
as it did from an interest in the experience of powerlessness (MacKinnon, 
1996), was seen as a means of giving voice to those previously at the margins 
and has effectively, and prolifically, expanded our understanding of what it is 
like to be marginalised, oppressed, victimised, ignored and silenced. But even 
as this is so, it is my contention, contra Barthes, that narrative and the process 
of narration (narrativity) as we currently conceive and operationalise it 
excludes certain individuals and groups of people, creating people without 
narrative. These people are those I shall call the ‘narratively dispossessed’. In 
the first part of this paper I will seek to outline what I mean by this and work 





towards a tentative definition. In the latter part I will attempt to suggest some 
ways in which we might try to think about narrative/narrativity somewhat 
differently so as to narratively ‘re-possess’ these individuals and groups. 
 
 
A Note About Narrative 
 
Narrative is a general term that encompasses many genres and media. But this 
‘almost infinite diversity of forms’ (Barthes, 1977: 79), is recognisably 
narrative because of certain structural features that distinguish it from other 
forms of recording events such as annals. I want here to focus on just three 
such structural features, features that I believe are currently central (though not 
exclusive) to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of narrative/ 
narrativity: narrative agency; narrative consistency and coherency; and, 
emplotment. Although these features are inextricably interwoven I will explore 
each in turn, attempting to illustrate how people may be unable to engage 
narratively with others and the world because of the way that narrative/ 
narrativity have been constructed. As such, I have chosen the experience of 
people living with dementia as a possible template that might, with due accord 
for the uniqueness of experience, be applied to others, such as those 





A fundamental aspect of narrativity is being able to tell one’s story. This 
narrative agency depends upon: 
 
a) being able to express oneself in a form that is recognisable as a narrative, 
even if one’s linguistic abilities are limited (see Booth and Booth, 1996; 
Goodley, 1996); 
 
b) having the opportunity to express oneself narratively. 
 
 To express oneself narratively requires a degree of conformity to narrative 
rules or habits or customs. Adherence to such rules, habits, customs might vary 
in degree but it becomes apparent that beyond a certain threshold ‘differences 
of degree effectively become differences of kind; beyond that point a sequence 
may begin to display so little narrativity that it can no longer be processed as a 
story at all’ (Herman, 2002: 100). Consider the following from Herman (2002): 
1. A bad man walked in. Then a beneficent sorcerer pulled the lever, and the 
bad man was instantaneously inebriated. 
 




2. A splubba walked in. A gingy beebed the yuck, and the splubba was orped. 
 
3. Oe splubba fibblo. Sim oe gingy beebie ca yuck, i ca splubba orpa. 
 
 The first of these is easily and straightforwardly recognisable as a 
narrative. The second, while unintelligible in terms of what actually happened 
and to whom or what, is recognisable as a narrative: first this happened, then 
that. The third displays zero narrativity because it ‘lacks sufficient grammatical 
structure for recipients to infer actants and entities populating a story world’ 
(Herman, 2002: 102). 
 For those living with dementia the difficulties encountered with expressive 
language and loss of memory for recent events and disorientation to place and 
time may limit the possibility of engaging narratively with the world and with 
others. Utterances may appear to others as lacking in meaning due to the 
person’s difficulty retrieving the correct word from memory or difficulty 
putting words in the correct sequence along with the mis-identification and 
difficulty retrieving the characters, events or context. If one expects a higher 
degree of conformity to narrative rules, habits or customs, then it is possible 
that one would see people living with dementia as losing narrative agency 
sooner rather than later. 
 The second element of narrative agency is having the opportunity to 
express oneself narratively. People living with dementia, however, find 
themselves narratively constrained in two ways. First, opportunities for 
narrative expression are limited: people living with dementia may experience a 
loss of control, in that decisions are made for them (and stories made about 
them) as they are increasingly defined as lacking capacity and a loss of 
narrative opportunity because of lessened opportunity for social interaction. 
Second, the mental space within which narratives can be told is constrained 
through the mobilisation of the meta-narrative of dementia which defines the 
person in terms of decline, loss and fragmented cognitive functioning (and thus 
less able to tell a recognisable narrative) and the recuperation of expressions of 
agency (such as ‘wandering’, ‘challenging behaviour’, fidgeting) as 
symptomatic of the dementia itself (see Kitwood, 1997). 
 
 
Narrative Consistency and Coherency 
 
A second feature of narrativity is a sense of consistency and coherency that 
holds together (more or less tightly) the events, characters and context in an 
understandable whole. For example, Polkinghorne (1995) suggests that there 
should be historical continuity of characters because such continuity enables 
the reader to understand the characters as individuals, acting upon, but not 
determined by, their history. By paying attention to the context and 





embodiment of the protagonist and to the significant others in the story a 
successful narrative establishes a backdrop against which to evaluate the 
narrative. The story emerges from this backdrop in a way that does not disrupt 
one's belief in, or jars with the backdrop, a disruptive episode which does not 
appear to link with past or future. Furthermore, the choices and actions of the 
protagonist should make sense against this backdrop and cohere with what we 
know of the protagonist. In other words, for a narrative to be successful, the 
historical continuity of backdrop, story and protagonist is maintained. 
 People living with dementia, however, may not display such narrative 
consistency or coherency. Events may be forgotten or remembered only 
partially or erroneously; characters may be forgotten or mis-remembered and 
the context of the story being told may not always be the expected one. So, a 
long dead character may appear alive, well and functioning in the narratives of 
people living with dementia because the person living with dementia has 
forgotten the death of that person; sons may be remembered as husbands or not 
recognised at all; and the story being told might not be consistent with the 
context or other stories previously told. In such circumstances the accounts of 
people living with dementia may well appear confused, contradictory, 






Emplotment is the process whereby events, characters and context are 
positioned in relationship to one another in such a way that the story moves 
from one position to another. This formulation of a narrative trajectory, 
realisable through time, is essential to narrative and is dependent upon 
consistency and coherency. The difficulty this poses for people living with 
dementia is that not only may events, characters and context become confused 
(see above) but the forgetting of the nature of things and the loss of memory 
and sense of time makes it far more difficult to emplot a story. Living 
progressively in the present with gaps in short-term memory and little 
conception of the future, it is hard to envisage how people living with dementia 
might construct a meaningful narrative. I thus come to the definition of what it 
means to be narratively dispossessed - a person (or group of people) is 
narratively dispossessed when it is not possible to construct a recognisable 
narrative because of the way recognisable narratives are conceived and the 








Dementia and Narrative 
 
Given the impact of the onset and progression of dementia on narrativity it is 
easy to see how and why people living with dementia come to be seen as 
having ‘lost the plot’. Losing the plot is, however, a serious matter if, as some 
believe, we are essentially narrative beings. If life is narrative, if we construct 
our Selves narratively, then losing narrativity (agency, consistency and 
coherency, and emplotment) has severe implications for our sense of Self and 
our being in the world. 
 In ceasing to be, or to be viewed as, narrative beings, people living with 
dementia are, in some ways, akin to Pirandello’s six characters in search of an 
author. Their lives, having been set in motion through narrative activity, can no 
longer progress because there is no author to give them narrative reality, 
trajectory or structure. This, of course, does not mean that there is no narrative 
to be constructed for, as the Father in Pirandello’s play says: “It [the book] is in 
us! The drama is in us, and we are the drama. We are impatient to play it. Our 
inner passion drives us on to this” (Pirandello, 1921: Online). 
 My concern in the rest of this chapter is to reflect on how we might re-
conceptualise narrative agency, consistency and coherency and emplotment so 
as to facilitate narrativity on the part of those people who are narratively 
dispossessed because their stories cannot be told within the current way of 
conceptualising and operationalising narrative as a means of accessing, 
understanding, creating and maintaining lives and identities. 
 
 
Re-Configuring Narrative Agency 
 
I want to suggest three ways in which we might think about reconfiguring 
narrative agency to include those who cannot currently engage in the narrative 
enterprise. The first is to seek to narrativise other symbolic means of 
expression. Stories can be articulated, for example, as much through dance, 
movement and artistic expression as they can language - if we as readers are 
sensitive enough to the narrative features of such media - and this is, of course, 
a familiar and common approach in the arts. Similarly, Downs et al. (in press) 
cite literature from Norberg and colleagues demonstrating the effectiveness of 
communication styles including affirmation, confirmation and communion. 
They also cite the growing use of sound, music, dance and movement in 
making contact. Observational methods such as Dementia Care Mapping (see 
review by Brooker, 2005) encourage us to adopt an empathic stance to our 
understanding of a person’s experience throughout the day. Second, we look 
towards the joint authorship of narratives where the narrative process is shared 
by people living with dementia and those around them. This may take the form 
of co-construction of narratives (see Keady and Williams, 2005, Williams and 





Keady, 2005) whereby the final narrative is very deliberately and consciously a 
negotiated product between those people living with dementia and others or the 
piecing together and progression of the fragmented narratives of people living 
with dementia by those who support them: 
 
The person with moderate or moderately severe dementia may be able to present 
only fragments of a performance story. The more a nurse knows about narrative 
components or the different sections of a story, the more easily he or she can 
identify and follow up on a story fragment offered by a person with dementia. 
 (Moore and Davis, 2002) 
 
 The third way to reconfigure narrative agency is to examine the 
contribution made by people with dementia to the narratives of others. This, in 
good part, is to understand the nature and role of reading in the process of 
narrativity. Illich (1996) in commenting on Hugh of St Victor’s Didascalion 
differentiates between monastic and scholastic reading. Scholastic reading, he 
says, views the text as an object to be debated (What is the author saying 
here?) while monastic reading was an embodied activity that viewed the text as 
having something to say directly to one’s experience and existence (What does 
this text say to my life?). It is my contention that by viewing the text of 
another’s life in this latter fashion we are opening the door to re-establishing 
some degree of narrative agency through contributing in a meaningful fashion 
to our own life narratives. 
 
 
Reconfiguring Narrative Consistency and Coherency 
 
The narratives of people living with dementia may at times appear to be 
fragmented, inconsistent and incoherent. This, however, may be seen as a 
function of an insistence on linear consistency and coherency rather than as 
inherently associated with dementia. We might, for instance, choose to 
reconfigure consistency and coherency to accommodate a sort of patchwork of 
fragments, individually uncertain in meaning or narrative value, into a 
meaningful whole. Moore and Davis (2002) refer to this as narrative quilting. 
Stories are thus related, not necessarily to what immediately preceded them but 
to others stories that have been told by or about the person living with 
dementia. The narrative consistency and coherency then rests not in 
chronology but in the assemblages of fragments related by meaning. The 
accurate reading, and meaningful assembly, of such fragmented stories requires 
the sort of narrative competence that Montello refers to when discussing the 
benefits of engaging with literary narratives (Montello, 1997): “joining one 
story with another, accurately to observe and make sense out of the chaos of 
suffering and loss” (p.194). 








Our final reconfiguration centres around the notion of emplotment. I want to 
suggest that rather than insist on a narrative trajectory that is maintained over a 
reasonably lengthy period of time, we focus on what Bamberg calls ‘small 
stories’, stories that privilege the fleeting and fragmented as contributing to the 
performance of identity in everyday interactions (Bamberg, 2004). Given the 
‘present-ness’ of people living with dementia, such a focus would seem to be 
highly appropriate and, from Bamberg’s work with adolescents, an effective 
means of recognising, acknowledging and supporting the creation and 
maintenance of Selves through the minutiae of everyday life. What is required 
is the ability to skilfully read and collect such small stories over different times 
and places so that they may be knitted into patterns that can be used to support 
the personhood of the person living with dementia. Emplotment thus becomes 
a process of assembling, over time, small stories that are related to one another 
in terms of expressions and developments of the Self in the face of changing 





The onset and progression of dementia threatens narrative abilities through its 
effect on language and cognitive function. Opportunities for narrativity may 
also be limited by a decrease in social interaction or the response of others who 
unnecessarily take over the narrative function or who recuperate attempts at 
narrative expression (such as ‘wandering’, ‘challenging behaviour’ and 
fidgeting) as symptomatic of the dementia. But the narrative dispossession of 
people living with dementia can also be seen as a function of how we 
conceptualise and operationalise narrative and narrativity. The focus, or 
insistence, on linear consistency, coherency and emplotment, coupled with a 
one-sided approach to narrative agency may also serve to dispossess people 
living with dementia from their (potential) narratives. In this paper I have 
attempted to indicate both how this is so, and how we might start to think about 
reconfiguring narrative agency, consistency and coherency, and emplotment so 
as to include and empower people living with dementia. 
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